Classic Philosophy Library - American Philosophy Collection Vol. 2-Various

Explore the profound insights of "American Philosophy Collection Vol. 2-Various," a compelling anthology that delves into the rich tapestry of American philosophical thought. This collection showcases diverse perspectives and ideas that have shaped the intellectual landscape of the nation, highlighting the enduring relevance of philosophical inquiry in understanding human experience. The themes presented resonate with contemporary discussions around identity, ethics, and the pursuit of knowledge, making it a vital listen for anyone interested in the foundations of American thought. Engaging with this collection invites listeners to reflect on how these philosophical ideas continue to influence our lives today and inspire future generations.

This episode includes AI-generated content.

Duration: 6h 6m
Broadcast on: 31 Oct 2026
Audio Format: other

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Philosophy is famous for its disagreements, which have contributed not a little towards bringing it into disrepute as being unscientific, subjective, or temperamental. These disagreements are due in part no doubt to the subject matter of philosophy, but chiefly to the lack of precision and uniformity in the use of words, and to the lack of deliberate cooperation and research. In having these failings, philosophy still differs widely from such sciences as physics and chemistry. They tend to make it seem mere opinion, for though the appearance of many figurative or loose expressions in the writings of isolated theorists, the impression is given that philosophical problems and their solutions are essentially personal. This impression is strengthened by the fact that philosophy concerns itself with emotions, temperaments, and taste. A conspicuous result of this lack of cooperation, common terminology, and a working agreement as to fundamental presuppositions is that genuine philosophical problems have been obscured, and real philosophical progress has been seriously hindered. It is therefore with the hope that by cooperation, genuine problems will be revealed, philosophical thought will be clarified, and a way opened for real progress, that the undersigned have come together, deliberated, and endeavored to reach an agreement. Such cooperation has three fairly distinct, though not necessarily successive stages. Secondly, it aims at a program of constructive work following a method founded on these principles and doctrines. Finally, it endeavors to obtain a system of axioms, methods, hypotheses, and facts, which have been so arrived at and formulated that at least those investigators who have cooperated can accept them as a whole. After several conferences, the undersigned have found that they hold certain doctrines in common. Some of these doctrines, which constitute a realistic platform, they hear with publish in the hope of carrying out further, the program stated above. Each list has a different author, but has been discussed at length, revised, and agreed to by the other conferees. The sixth list, therefore though differently formulated, are held to represent the same doctrines. By conferring on other topics, by interchange of ideas, and by systematic criticism of one another's phraseology, methods, and hypotheses, we hope to develop a common technique, a common terminology, and so finally, a common doctrine, which will enjoy some measure of that authority which the natural sciences possess. We shall have accomplished one of our purposes if our publications tempt other philosophers to form small cooperative groups with similar aims. Edwin B. Holt, Harvard University, Walter T. Marvin, Rutgers College, W.P. Montague, Columbia University, Ralph Barton Perry, Harvard University, Walter B. Pitkin, Columbia University, E. G. Spalding, Princeton University. Section 1. 1. The entities, objects, facts, etc. under study and logic, mathematics, and the physical sciences are not mental in any usual or proper meaning of the word mental. 2. The being and nature of these entities are in no sense conditioned by their being known. 3. The degree of unity, consistency, or connection, subsisting among entities is a matter to be empirically ascertained. 4. In the present stage of our knowledge, there is a presumption in favor of pluralism. 5. An entity subsisting, in certain relations to other entities, enters into new relations without necessarily negating or altering its already subsisting relations. 6. No self-consistent or satisfactory logic, or system of logic, so far invented countenances the organic theory of knowledge, or the internal view of relations. 7. Those who assert this anti-realistic view use in their exposition a logic which is inconsistent with their doctrine. 8. Edwin B. Holt. Section 2. 1. Epistemology is not logically fundamental. 4. Footnote. Some of the principles of logic are logically prior to any proposition that is deduced from other propositions. The theories of the nature of knowledge and of the relation of knowledge to its object are, for this reason, logically subsequent to the principles of logic. In short, logic is logically prior to any epistemological theory. Again, as theories of reality are deduced and are made to conform to the laws of logic, they too are logically subsequent to logic. And in so far as logic is logically present in them, it is itself a theory or part of a theory of reality. 8. End footnote. 2. There are many existential, as well as non-existential, propositions which are logically prior to epistemology. 8. Footnote. The terms knowledge, consciousness, and experience found in common sense and in psychology are not logically fundamental, but are logically subsequent to parts at least of a theory of reality that asserts the existence of terms and relations which are not consciousness or experience. 8. E.G., the psychical, is distinguished from the physical and the physiological. Now, idealism has not shown that the terms knowledge, consciousness, and experience of its epistemology or of its theory of reality are logically fundamental or indefinable, nor has it succeeded in defining them without logically prior terms that are elsewhere explicitly excluded from its theory of reality. In short, idealistic epistemologists have borrowed the terms knowledge, consciousness, and experience from psychology, but have ignored or denied the propositions in psychology that are logically prior. In other words, epistemology has not thus far made itself logically independent of psychology, nor has it freed itself logically from the common sense dualism of psychology. On the contrary, epistemology from Locke until today has been and has remained, in part at least, a branch of psychology. 3. There are certain principles of logic which are logically prior to all scientific and metaphysical systems.

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